MOSCOW (RIA Novosti commentator Pyotr Goncharov) - Russia will not lose no matter who wins the second round of the presidential election in Iran.
It has a fair chance of preserving its priority standing in Iran's foreign policy under any president - Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, chairman of the Expediency Discernment Council, technocrat and pragmatist, or his rival, the ultraconservative Tehran Mayor Mahmoud Ahmadi-Nejad, who produced a furore with his surprise success at the election. This is the unanimous opinion of most Russian experts.
Unlike Washington, which said the election in Iran was undemocratic and would not create a legitimate power, Moscow regards the election as a crucial event in the history of Iran and has pledged to respect the choice of millions of Iranians.
Radjab Safarov, director of the Center for Modern Iran Studies, thinks this is not simply a diplomatic gesture to Tehran. The election campaign, he said, "has turned into a national referendum where the people expressed their support for the country's political system." He said it was notable that none of the observers reported falsification of voting results.
In his opinion, radical changes in Iran's foreign policy with regard to Russia are improbable no matter who comes to power, the pragmatic reformer Rafsanjani or his opponent, the conservative radical Nejad.
The main reason is that under Iran's constitution the president is not the head of state and hence not the last instance in decision-making. The strategy of Iran's foreign policy is approved by the unelected spiritual leader and the actual head of state, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei.
Yet much will depend on the president, as Rafsanjani has proved once. During his previous presidency, Iran opted for liberal reforms and many Russians still remember that bilateral relations became lively and Russia got the contract for the construction of the Bushehr nuclear power plant.
Moscow should not be embarrassed by Rafsanjani's calls for normalizing relations with the U.S., as this would be a positive development for Moscow. The West will stop pressuring it to terminate nuclear cooperation with Iran. Described as a pragmatic politician, Rafsanjani will most probably welcome a broader Russian involvement in the Iranian projects.
Neither would Russia lose its standing in Iran if Nejad wins the election. Moreover, Safarov holds that Russia would get a carte blanche in oil, gas and, of course, nuclear projects. On the other hand, this may increase Western, including U.S., pressure on Russia.
But some Russian experts are dissatisfied with the current stage in Moscow-Tehran relations. Nina Mamedova, head of the Iranian sector at the Russian Institute of Oriental Studies, agrees that the victory of either candidate would not seriously influence bilateral relations. The trouble is not that Russia has serious rivals in Iran, she said, but that bilateral relations, contrary to numerous declarations, are far from impressive. Russia is not sufficiently active on the Iranian market. Tehran is waiting for a breakthrough in bilateral relations and links its hopes to the visit of President Putin.
Nuclear cooperation remains the priority sphere for Russia. The outcome of the presidential election will not affect the pace of the Iranian nuclear program. All political leaders of Iran support the plans of building a network of nuclear power stations. Tehran wants to develop nuclear power engineering so as to preserve its hydrocarbons reserves.
So far, Russia has no major rivals in this sphere, mostly thanks to the stand of the Tehran authorities. This stand with regard to Russia may change only for the better as a result of the election.
But is Russia, which has pledged to accept any winner, ready to advance its interests in Iran more energetically?
