MOSCOW. (Alexei Makarkin, for RIA Novosti) - Until recently, Uzbek President Islam Karimov was considered a U.S. partner in Central Asia.
His country was a member of GUUAM, a bloc believed to be an alternative to Russian influence in the post-Soviet space. In 2001, Uzbekistan hosted an American military base, officially to help with the counter-terrorist operation in Afghanistan. But now Uzbekistan's relations with the U.S. and other Western countries have deteriorated dramatically. Events in Andizhan and demands for an international investigation of the Uzbek authorities' actions were the last straw.
Tashkent had begun to change its pro-Western orientation in 2002, when Uzbekistan in effect froze its GUUAM membership. In May of this year, Karimov announced his country's withdrawal from the bloc. What was behind this decision?
The fundamental question for Karimov is how to avoid a revolution. That was uppermost in his mind well before the Rose Revolution in Georgia, to say nothing of Ukraine's Orange version. In fact, at the turn of the century, Karimov had two choices for preventing a possible revolution that can tentatively be described as "Western" and "Russo-Chinese".
The Western recipe envisaged pluralistic political life, and free elections monitored by outside observers and involving as many contenders as possible. This is a model that the U.S. is increasingly pushing in a number of countries - in some cases by military might (Afghanistan and Iraq) and in others through political pressure (Lebanon and Egypt). But for Karimov this option was unacceptable, because it could lead to his electoral defeat, with consequences very different from a similar scenario in, say, Europe. A change of rule in Asian states usually entails a massive redivision of spheres of influence in politics and economics, rather than a civilised withdrawal to the opposition.
Yet another problem is the nature of the opposition. Before the 1975-1990 civil war, for example, Lebanon already had democratic traditions. In the Iraqi case, there was a multi-party and, as it turned out, well-rooted emigre population whose members now assumed power. In Uzbekistan, the basic alternative to power is in effect radical Islamists allowed to legalise themselves by the Western recipe. These were the same forces that engineered the revolt in Andizhan. Incidentally, by insisting on the liberalisation of the Turkish political regime (virtually a condition for acceptance into the EU), Europe is unwittingly contributing to the development of an Islamic movement as an alternative to Kemal Ataturk's secular state.
Political logic therefore pushed Karimov towards the "Russo-Chinese" recipe, which means betting not on democratization, but on stability, a strong hand, and preservation of the incumbent regime, which is given carte blanche in its confrontation with the opposition, especially if the latter resorts to violence. Hence Uzbekistan's withdrawal from GUUAM, and its vigorous moves within the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation (SCO), the informal leaders of which are Russia and China. This could also be seen at this week's SCO summit in the Kazakh capital, Astana. Understandably, both Russia and China backed the Karimov regime's actions in Andizhan, saving the latter from international isolation when it seemed to be threatened by the tough negative stance adopted by Western nations, media and public organizations.
In response, Russia is expecting Uzbekistan to take real reciprocal steps in various fields, including defense. Uzbekistan's Army, for one, is expected to convert from NATO to Russian standards in training and equipment. "Our bilateral relations in military and military-technical fields have been visibly gaining speed over recent years," Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov said last week. According to some sources, Uzbekistan may allow Russia to use its infrastructure, including air force airfields, for possible Russian special operations in crisis situations. A more remote possibility is for Uzbekistan to rejoin the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), a bloc uniting Russia and its military and political allies in the post-Soviet space. Ironically, the CSTO founding treaty was signed in 1992 in Tashkent, the Uzbek capital.
Alexei Makarin is deputy director general of the Centre for Political Technologies.
